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The State's Interest Re-evaluated
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts must often determine under what circumstances a
competent adult may be forced to submit to medical treatment
necessary to save his life. The question most frequently
arises when doctors, hospital officials, and other interested par-
ties seek a court order authorizing them to administer the treat-
ment necessary. Due to the emergency situation associated with
these cases, the court often must render its decision immediately.
During these proceedings, the patient is rarely represented by
counsel, or if he is, the attorney has had little time to prepare
an adequate defense. Further, there generally is no standard of
medical proof to determine whether the treatment is actually
necessary to save the patient's life; thus, the doctor's allegations
are accepted as accurate. Because of the urgency and the court's
natural inclination to attempt to save the patient's life,' the
patient's legal rights can be easily overlooked. The purpose of
this Note is to examine the rights and interests involved in
these situations and to suggest an appropriate legal standard for
compelling medical treatment.
II. ORIGINS OF A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO DECLINE
NECESSARY MEDICAL TREATMENT
Generally, every individual has a legal right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. This right originated in the common law and is
incorporated in the constitutional rights of freedom of religion
and privacy.
A. COMMON LAW
Under the common law principle of the inviolability of the
1. For an interesting example of this see Powell v. Columbian
Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct.
1965), where the patient had refused to consent to a blood transfusion
and the court stated:
How legalistic minded our society has become, and what an
ultra-legalistic maze we have created to the extent that society
and the individual have become enmeshed and paralyzed by its
unrealistic entanglements!
I was reminded of "The Fall" by Camus, and I knew that
no release-no legalistic absolution-would absolve me or the
court from responsibility if I, speaking for the court, answered
"No" to the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" This woman
wanted to live. I could not let her die!
Id. at 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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body, all competent adults have a right to make their own medi-
cal decisions. Thus, a doctor may commit a battery if he treats
a patient without proper consent; 2 and it is no defense that no
harm was inflicted3 or that the treatment proved beneficial.4
However, in an emergency where a patient is unable to express
his will, consent may be implied on the assumption that the
patient would consent if he were able.5 If the patient expressly
rejects treatment prior to becoming incompetent, consent cannot
subsequently be implied when the patient is dying.,
The principle which prohibits doctors from treating an ob-
jecting patient has recently been extended to prohibit courts
from compelling a competent adult to submit to treatment. In
Erickson v. Dilgard,7 the court denied a doctor's application to
administer a lifesaving blood transfusion to a competent adult
patient who had consented to an operation but would not con-
sent to the transfusion. The court recognized that a medical
decision is always a question of judgment to be made by the
patient. The court reasoned: "[I]t is the individual who is
the subject of a medical decision who has the final say and
that this must necessarily be so in a system of government
which gives the greatest possible protection to the individual
in the furtherance of his own desires." s Thus, it appears that
Erickson is authority for the proposition that a competent adult
can never be forced to submit to unwanted treatmentP
2. E.g., Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Mohr v.
Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Rolater v. Strain, 39
Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913). See generally McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. Rsv. 381
(1957); Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 Mm. L. REV. 189
(1961); Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Sur-
gery, 14 RocKy MT. L. REV. 233 (1948).
3. See, e.g., Donald v. Swann, 24 Ala. App. 463, 137 So. 178 (1931);
Keister v. O'Neil, 59 Cal. App. 2d 428, 138 P.2d 723 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943);
McCoid, supra note 2, at 403.
4. See authority cited supra note 3.
5. Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); King
v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922). See Powell, supra note 2,
at 199; 42 KY. L.J. 98 (1953); 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rmv. 627 (1957); cf. Rogers v.
Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936) (dicta).
6. Powell, supra note 2, at 197, 199.
7. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
8. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
9. However, the Erickson case can also be read as holding that
treatment can be compelled if it is absolutely certain the patient will
die, as then there would be no question of judgment.
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B. CONSTrUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Commonly the guarantee of free exercise of religion 0 is
asserted by the patient to avoid medical treatment." While
one's freedom to believe is absolute,12 this freedom is subject to
certain limitations when it is transmitted into actions.' 3 The
basic limitation is the existence of a compelling public interest
which conflicts with the individual's private interest.' 4 Thus,
the Supreme Court has upheld statutes that prohibit polygamous
marriages as advocated by Mormons' 5 and statutes that pro-
hibit children of Jehovah's Witnesses from selling religious maga-
zines in the street. 6
At least one party has successfully invoked this constitu-
tional guarantee to avoid compulsory medical treatment. In
In re Brooks' Estate,'7 a seriously ill Jehovah's Witness volun-
tarily sought treatment, but refused to consent to transfusions
believed necessary to save her life.1s The appellate court re-
10. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. CHr. L. REv. 1 (1961).
11. See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1965); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). These cases concern
Jehovah's Witnesses who have refused to consent to blood transfusions
because of absolute scriptural proscriptions against "eating blood." See
How, Religion, Medicine & Law, 3 CAw. B.J. 365, 368 (1960). While this
prohibition is absolute, judicial decisions are made easier because pa-
tients often will not physically resist treatment if it is forced upon them;
they merely refuse to consent. The patients evidently believe if the
transfusion is forced upon them the responsibility is shifted to the court
and they are absolved. Although the Biblical prohibition against blood
transfusions seems absolute, each individual should be free to interpret
his own religion. Thus, the patient's religious beliefs may not be in-
fringed by the court's ordering treatment. The cases should be of little
value as precedent where the patient believes that the prohibitions are
absolute.
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
13. Ibid.
14. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1962). The court
in in re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), used the
older test of requiring an overt act that presented a "clear and present
danger" to society. See 44 TEXAS L. REV. 190, 191 (1965). Due to the
tenor of the Brooks opinion, it seems likely that the court would have
reached the same result using the compelling state interest test.
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
17. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
18. Although the appeal came after the transfusions were given,
the court allowed it on the basis of presenting an issue of substantial
19661
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versed an order authorizing the administration of the transfu-
sion on the ground that the authorization constituted an un-
constitutional interference with the patient's freedom of religion.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Additional support for the right to refuse medical treatment
may be provided by the constitutional right of privacy. In
establishing the constitutional right of marital privacy, the Su-
preme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 9 demonstrated a will-
ingness to protect the right to be let alone.20 While the scope
of Griswold is unclear,21 it seems likely that the "zones of pri-
vacy" will encompass the individual's freedom from compulsory
medical treatment. Although the Court did not articulate the
standard to be applied, Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion
hinted that the balancing approach would be used.
22
Logically, it is difficult to distinguish the arguments sup-
porting the judical protection of inviolability of the body and
those advanced in support of the constitutional right of privacy.
Clearly both concepts are rooted in the American traditions of
individual freedom and an abhorrence of the state's unreasonable
intrusion in private relations.2 3 in establishing an appropriate
standard with respect to privacy and compulsory medical treat-
ment, consideration should be given to the standard applied in
the freedom of religion area. A person who refuses medical
treatment on philosophical or moral grounds should have his
right as vigorously protected as a person who refuses on religious
grounds.
public interest. See Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 102 N.E.2d 769
(1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (anticontraceptive statute an invasion of
marital privacy).
20. The Court declared this right existed not in any one of the Bill
of Rights amendments, but in the penumbra of several of them. In Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Brandeis in a dis-
senting opinion declared the existence of a similar right--"the right to
be left alone." Id. at 471. See generally Symposium on the GriswoZd
Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
21. It has been suggested that the right was left open-ended. Dixon,
The Griswold Penumbra, 64 MTLcH. L. REV. 205 (1965).
22. See Griswold v. United States, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Emer-
son, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mcn. L. REV. 230, 232-33
(1965).
A distinction must be drawn between the common law right of pri-
vacy and the constitutional right of privacy. The latter relates to state
interference rather than interference by an individual.
23. See Griswold v. United States, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Erickson
v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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As a practical matter, however, consistent results may not
be reached in every case. A compelling public interest in the
area of privacy does not necessarily qualify as such in the area
of religion since different rights are being protected. Further,
the right of privacy is a newly recognized right and may well
be applied conservatively; thus, little in the way of a public
interest will be necessary to allow lawful invasions of privacy.
If the standard associated with freedom of religion is not ap-
plied, the standard suggested in Sherbert v. Verner,24 which
requires something more than a rational relationship to a color-
able public interest, would be the best rule to avoid completely
emasculating the right of privacy.
II. LIMITATIONS ON A PATIENT'S ABILITY TO DECLINE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. THE STATE POLICE POWER
The state has the power to protect the lives of its citizens
from interference by others. Under this police power concept the
state may regulate its internal affairs for the protection and pro-
motion of general health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citi-
zens even where it proves to be inconvenient or offensive to a
particular individual.25 Even certain fundamental rights which
an individual considers dear must yield if the interests of society
as a whole demand the contrary.
There are numerous examples of such a compelling state
interest in the realm of compulsory medical treatment. In
Sadlock v. Board of Education,26 it was argued that compulsory
vaccination violated the rights of religious freedom and personal
liberty. However, the court upheld a school board resolution
making vaccination mandatory for admission to school because it
was within the state's police power to prescribe reasonable
methods to combat disease. Similarly, to prevent disease, a
state can pass a statute requiring purification of sewage and
public water supply, 7 authorize a court to appoint a guardian
for unvaccinated minors, and vaccinate them,28 and authorize
24. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1962).
25. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1906).
26. 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); accord, Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904). But see Kolbeck v. Kramer, 84 N.J. Super.
569, 202 A.2d 889 (Super. Ct. 1964).
27. State Bd. of Health v. City of Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E.
1019 (1912).
28. Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) (children
not admitted to school without vaccination).
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the health department to quarantine a person suspected of
having venereal disease.29 Further, a state university can deny
admission to a student who refuses to submit to an x-ray exami-
nation for the detection of a tubercular infection.
3 0
This line of cases has been cited as authority for the state's
power to force a nonconsenting adult to submit to medical
treatment. It should be noted, however, that none of the courts
in these cases actually compelled treatment of an individual;
rather, they sanctioned imposition of criminal penalties or depri-
vation of social or political privileges as the alternative to re-
fusing treatment.
B. PARENS PA'IAE
It is generally recognized that the state as parens patriae3l
has the power of guardianship over minors and incompetents.3 2
Parens patriae stems from the state's self-imposed duty to pro-
tect the welfare of these classes of individuals.33  The courts
have occasionally employed this power to order actual medical
treatment. Thus, in In re Vasco,34 a two year old child suffering
from a probably malignant eye disease was provided with a
necessary operation by order of the court over the parents'
refusal to consent. The court held that the child was entitled
to the protection of the law, and that where the parents arbi-
trarily35 failed to provide proper medical treatment the court
could order the necessary treatment. In Mitchell v. Davis,36
where a seriously ill child was given only prayers as treatment,
the court ordered temporary custody of the child to be given to
the juvenile officials who would provide the necessary treat-
29. Ex parte Kilbane, 32 Ohio Op. 530, 67 N.E.2d 22 (C.P. 1945);
see Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914) (mandatory
venereal disease test for marriage license was constitutional).
30. State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239'P.2d 545 (1952).
31. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953). Parents have a strong
natural interest in the custody and control of their children. This in-
cludes supervision and physical well-being. However, the courts have
agreed the state has an overriding interest and can interfere where the
child's life or health is in danger.
32. See, e.g., In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915); Mc-
Intosh v. Dell, 86 Okla. 1, 205 Pac. 917 (1922). See generally FooE,
LEvY & SANDER, CASES ON FAMILY LAW 367-94 (1966).
33. See 64 MicE. L. REV. 554, at 555 (1966).
34. 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933).
35. There is some question whether it was arbitrarily refused. The
court recognized that medical science was not exact, and that there was
only a 50% chance of cure. Id. at 130, 263 N.Y. Supp. at 555.
36. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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ment. Other courts have invoked the power of parens patriae
in ordering surgical care for a child suffering from a limb de-
formity 37 and in authorizing blood transfusions to a child where
his life was in danger.3  When the parents refused consent be-
cause of their religious convictions, one court appointed a guard-
ian for an unborn child so a necessary blood transfusion could
be given to the child upon birth.39
However, this power has limitations. For example, the
amputation of a twelve year old child's severely deformed arm
was not ordered where the parents' objection was based on a
fear of the possible failure of the operation.40 In reaching its
decision, the court seemed particularly impressed by the risk
of death inherent in the operation. Thus, the court will not
order treatment for a child when the treatment is dangerous
to life or there is a significant difference of opinion as to the
efficacy of the proposed treatment.41 In these cases, the parents'
decision will be controlling.
Two recent decisions extend parens patrae to compulsory
treatment of nonconsenting adults. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson,42 a pregnant woman refused to
consent to blood transfusions prior to giving birth because of her
religious beliefs. The plaintiff hospital, seeking a court order to
allow it to give the transfusion, argued that the mother was
likely to hemorrhage and that there was a strong possibility
that both mother and child would die as a result. In reversing
the lower court's decision, it was held that the state has an
37. In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1941) (psychological injury caused by social rejection).
38. E.g., Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). In these
cases the parents refused to grant consent to-the blood transfusions for
religious reasons. In Perricone, without the transfusion the child wouilc
have died or suffered neurological disability.
39. Hoener v. Bertinato. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. &
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961). Previous to this action the same parents had one
child who survived because of a similar order, and another who died
because there was no order.
40. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); cf. In re
Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952). In the Frank case, the
parents refused to have a child's speech impediment corrected. How-
ever, this refusal was not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the
child was a dependent child. Such a conclusion would authorize a court
to award custody of the child to someone who would have the impedi-
ment corrected.
41. See Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
42. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
1966]
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interest in protecting unborn children and that this interest
justifies ordering unwanted transfusions where it is the only
alternative available to save the child's life. However, the
court expressly limited its holding by stating that it had not
reached the question of whether a competent adult may be
compelled to submit to medical treatment solely to save his own
life because under the instant facts the lives of the parent and
child were so "intertwined and unseparable.
' 43
rn Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College,44 where the mother of a seven month old child volun-
tarily entered the hospital but would not consent to transfusions
necessary to save her life because of her religious convictions, an
emergency order was granted authorizing the transfusions. The
court reasoned that because the patient was in extremis and
non compos mentis she was no more able to competently make
decisions than a child. The court also pointed out that the
patient has a responsibility to the community to care for her
child, and the state, as parens patriae, can not tolerate parental
conduct which constitutes child abandonment, particularly "this
most ultimate of voluntary abandonments." 45  The conclusion
suggested by this case is that the state can order treatment
where the adult patient is either incompetent or has dependents
to whom he has a responsibility of care.
Arguably, Georgetown is subject to the criticism of ex-
tending the parens patriae concept beyond its intended limits.
While the concept does extend to incompetents, to allow a court
to order treatment where an objecting patient is non compos
mentis because of his illness may prove dangerous. If the pa-
tient has not previously objected, a court could wait until he is
sufficiently incapacitated and then base the determination to
authorize treatment on incompetency. Should this be done, the
43. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
44. 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (1964), cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 978 (1965). In Georgetown, the federal judge who heard
the case purported not to decide the issue on the merits, but rather he
issued the order only to maintain the status quo-to prevent mootness
by the patient's death before full consideration. However, the dissent
states that the status quo was not achieved because the issue was mooted
by the recovery of the patient. 331 F.2d at 1011. It is clear that the
status quo cannot be maintained in these cases. It is relevant to note
that no decision has been had on the merits of this case and it should
be of little value as precedent.
45. Id. at 1008. The reason for the incompetency is of little import.
See, e.g., Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308, 271 Pac. 411 (1928); In re Wann's




court has effectively circumvented the patient's right to refuse
treatment. This right should be protected even after the pa-
tient can no longer assert it. 46 Also, there is a danger that any
decision by the patient which is inconsistent with the general
mores of society could be evidence of incompetency. Thus, a
patient could be declared incompetent merely because treatment
was refused. 47 Such action would be a totally irresponsible use
of parens patriae.
Two other criticisms of the Georgetown decision may be
advanced. First, while the court correctly found a public inter-
est sufficient to justify ordering medical treatment-the parent's
responsibility to care for his children-the court was incorrect in
basing its decision on the parens patriae concept. The purpose
of parens patriae is to provide a vehicle for the court to
physically protect the child and not to protect a parent so he can
in turn provide for his child. Second, the court's "ultimate aban-
donment" argument48 seemingly overlooked the existence of the
remaining parent who presumably can care for the child.49
More importantly, rather than abandoning the child, it can be
argued that the parents are providing the child with an impor-
tant moral lesson-the value one should place upon his princi-
ples and religious convictions.
C. OTHER PUBLIC INTERESTS
Other public interests may be suggested to buttress the
court's decision to order treatment. The argument for protec-
tion of dependent children could be extended to other dependent
relatives. However, this is not a sufficiently compelling interest
because those people should be able to care for themselves.
Even weaker is the argument that the state may have an
interest in allowing a doctor to perform his duties to the best
of his abilities. This interest evidently is the benefit gained
through the raising of public confidence in the medical profes-
sion, or the belief that the over-all performance of the medical
46. See 9 UTAH L. REv. 161, 169 (1964).
47. See 113 U. PA. L. REV. 290, 294 (1964). The author of this
article suggests this is what actually happened in Georgetown because
there is little in the record to demonstrate incompetence. This argu-
ment may have more weight where the person offers no reason for his
refusal.
48. States can interfere when a parent abandons his child. See
State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 AUt. 597 (1905); Palmer v. State, 223
Md. 341, 64 A.2d 467 (1960).
49. See Lane v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963);
113 U. PA. L. REv. 290, 294 (1964).
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profession will be higher if each doctor is allowed to do his ut-
most for every patient.50 However, this interest of society is
not sufficient to outweigh society's interest in allowing an indi-
vidual freedom of choice in such matters.
D. INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE INmVIDUAL FROM HIMSELF
Where there is no other public interest present, the state
may nevertheless argue that it has sufficient interest in each
individual to protect him from himself, and authorize unwanted
medical treatment on that basis. This interest is based upon the
belief that each citizen makes a valuable contribution to society.
This proposition has not yet been advanced, and indeed it should
not be, for this interest is not sufficient to outweigh the in-
dividual's right to refuse treatment.
There is, however, authority that could be used as precedent
for a court to protect a person from his own improvident deci-
sions. For example, while it would seem to be a matter of
personal concern, courts have uniformly upheld legislation au-
thorizing fluoridation of water.5 ' However, this line of cases is
clearly distinguishable. In Dowell v. City of Tulsa,5 2 the city's
inclusion of fluoride was held not to be medical treatment.5 3
Further, one commentator has suggested that the treatment is
not forced upon the individual for his own well-being, but
rather is intended for the benefit of the vast majority of the
community who do not object.54 Also, a person objecting to
the fluoridation has a number of reasonable alternatives avail-
able such as using bottled water. In effect, the interference is
just not sufficient to constitute a violation of a person's legal
rights.
Cases which uphold statutes prohibiting the use of poisonous
snakes in religious ceremonies55 further illustrate the state's
50. See 64 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1966).
51. See, e.g., De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273
P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1954); Kraus v. City
of Cleveland, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 214, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1954). See
generally 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 284 (1954).
52. 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954).
53. Id. at 864.
54. See 9 UTAH L. REV. 160, 165 (1964).
55. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942);
State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom.,
Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn.
17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). But cf. State v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394




ability to protect an individual from himself, although these
cases are also distinguishable. While the primary danger is to
those handling the snakes, who presumably do not want pro-
tection, there is some risk to spectators and to the general public
if the snakes were to escape. However, it can be argued that
the intent of these statutes is to protect those other than the
handler and absolute prohibition is not necessary because the
handlers could be required to perform in an escape proof glass
cage. 0 Clearly the answer is that these statutes are the most
reasonable way to protect the public and were not intended to
protect only those in actual contact with the snakes.
The increasingly infrequent legislation which makes suicide
or attempted suicide a crime 57 might also be thought of as an
example of the state seeking to protect an individual from him-
self. Because of the concern with preserving the life of an in-
dividual, it has been suggested that the suicide statutes provide
an analogy for compelling medical treatment.58  However, it is
probable that the suicide statutes were passed not so much to
protect the individual from himself as to prevent the disruptive
effect which suicide has on society. Furthermore, there is a
basis for distinction on the underlying facts. Because most
people who attempt suicide are temporarily incompetent and ir-
rational,0 there appears to be no value in allowing such an
individual a freedom of choice.
If the refusal of medical treatment necessary to sustain
life is thought to violate the suicide statutes, it could provide the
courts with a legal handle sufficient to justify its interference.
Actually, refusal of treatment is not attempted suicide because
death is not the primary objective; rather, it is a possible conse-
quence. Suicide requires a specific, intentional action which is
not satisfied by a passive refusal of treatment.60 Intent does
include situations where a result is not substantially certain.61
56. 9 UTAH L. REv. 160, 165 n.27 (1964).
57. There are only six states which now have suicide statutes.
PERmNS, CRnvIAL LAw 67-68 (1957).
58. Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MMNx. L. REv.
48, 68 (1954); 3 FoRDEAm L. REV. 513 (1965); 26 MONT. L. REV. 95 (1965);
44 TEXAS L. REv. 190 (1965); 9 UTAH L. REV. 160 (1964). However, this
theory was rejected in Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
59. See DuBmN, SncnIDE 144 (1963); PERPINS, op. cit. supra note 57.
60. Although the refusal of medical treatment may be enough action
to infer an intention to die, this should be negated by the fact that the
patient voluntarily came to the hospital seeking aid. See 33 FoRDAMV
L. REV. 513, 516 (1965); 26 MONT. L. REV. 95 (1965).
61. See generally 33 FORDHAm L. REV. 513 (1965).
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However, there would be intent in this context only where it is
certain the patient will die. Thus it is unlikely that suicide
legislation provides a specific ground to compel treatment.
62
IV. THE STANDARD
While it could be argued that the Dilgard case is authority
for the proposition that a competent adult may never be forced
to submit to medical treatment, the most reasonable approach
to an individual's right to refuse medical treatment is to im-
pose certain limitations on that right. Before considering the
standard for ordering medical treatment, two other problems
must be examined. First, some uniform standard of medical
proof must be established. The issue of compulsory treatment
should only be reached after the medical diagnosis is found to be
sound. 3 In determining whether the judgment is sound, the
opinion of the doctors seeking authorization should be carefully
scrutinized in view of their involvment. Ideally, impartial ex-
pert testimony should be taken, but this may be impractical in
most cases due to the emergency nature of the problem. However,
this may be solved by requiring the judge to seek affidavits
from competent doctors independent of the proceeding. If it is
clear that the patient will die without the treatment, the prob-
lems of finding a state interest may be reached. However,
where it is not certain the patient will die, or where the neces-
sary treatment involves a high degree of risk, or is of question-
able medical value, the decision should be left to the patient.
Second, a person must be competent to be permitted to refuse
treatment. In emergency situations where the patient who re-
fuses treatment is incompetent, his decision should only be re-
spected when he has expressed his refusal prior to the emer-
gency. In all circumstances the patient is entitled to an honest,
objective appraisal of his competency.
A competent adult who will die if certain treatment is not
administered, should have a right to refuse medical treatment.
62. Contra, Perr, Suicide Responsibilities of Hospital and Psychia-
trist, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 427, 433 (1960); 33 FoRDAM L. REV. 513 (1965);
cf. Crawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MtNN. L. Rav. 48,
68 (1954). It has been suggested that the interests of the individual
may be outweighed by the interests of society if the individual's talents
or skills are of immense benefit to society. 64 McH. L. REv. 554, 556
(1966). However, it is questionable whether any amount of benefit is
more valuable than the individual's freedom of choice.
63. Courts must use this power sparingly. Otherwise, the danger
of the courts being brought in to re-examine every medical decision may
arise. 9 UTAH L. REv. 160, 167 (1964).
[Vol. 51:293
1966] COMPULSORY TREATMENT 305
That rule should be qualified only where there is a substan-
tially compelling public interest in conflict with his right. The
ultimate test of a compelling public interest is where a third
person who is incapable of protecting himself will be directly
and adversely affected if the patient dies.
